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Small-Scale Manufacturing and
the Weaving Industry in Indonesia
The Weaving Industry and Ciluluk Village Up through the Sukarno Era
Small-Scale Manufacturing and the Weaving Industry: 1950 through the Sukarno
Era
With the coming of national political independence, Indonesia set out to free itself
economically from the bonds of its former colonial capital control. Emphasis was put
on policies aimed at the “Indonesianization” (Indonesianisasi) of the economy
(Sutter 1959), which for small-scale manufacturing during the period meant none
other than the promotion of indigenous Indonesian (pribumi) business enterprises.
One case in point is the weaving industry, whose mills possessed 72,025 hand-
looms and 11,267 power-looms in 1951. In contrast to pribumi firms accounting for
69.5 per cent of the firms, they owned only 40 per cent of the hand-looms and just 8
per cent of the power-looms. In contrast, Chinese firm owners controlled 40 per cent
of the hand-looms and 44 per cent of the power-looms, while a mere 1 per cent of the
European firms in the industry controlled 30 per cent of power-looms and 1 per cent
of the hand-looms (Sutter 1959: 804).
Historically, by the 1910s pribumi weavers survived in limited areas only for
household or local consumption under a colonial-capital protectionist policy, but at
the end of the 1920s the colonial government introduced the improved treadle hand-
loom1 (hereafter simply “hand-loom”) and the growth of pribumi weaving took place
in the hand-loom industry from the 1930s, mainly in the Majalaya region of then
Bandung Regency (Regentschap) of West Java (Matsuo 1970: 19–48; Aten 1952:
194–99; Warmelo 1939: 5–22).2 Nevertheless, from the end of the 1930s the weav-
ing industry in the Dutch East Indies became dominated by Dutch and Chinese firms
(Aten 1952: 196–99).
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The Natsir cabinet formed in 1950 implemented the “Benteng Program,” under
which import licenses were granted and credit extended to pribumi traders (Sutter
1959: 1017–29). Then in 1951 central cooperative plants (induks) began to be con-
structed in the centers of various industries (Majalaya in the case of weaving) for the
purpose of promoting local industry, followed by the implementation of the Mecha-
nization of Small-Scale Industries Program. In 1955, with the establishment of the
Foundation for Supplies of Raw Materials (JPBR—Jajasan Perbekalan Bahan-bahan
Perindustrian), the price and amount of imported cotton yarn was controlled and yarn
was allocated to pribumi-weavers at prices lower than market prices (Palmer 1972:
81–99, 140–42).
In the field of commerce, 1957–58 saw an accelerated attempt to take over and
nationalize Dutch trading companies, which were dominating Indonesia’s foreign
trade. In April of 1959, seven of the nine state trading enterprises (perusahaan
dagang negara), for example Juda Bhakti, were given the sole rights to import all
textile materials, which were to be supplied to pribumi weavers through coopera-
tives. At the same time, the Ministry of People’s Industry (Kementerian Industri
Rakyat) determined the amount of yarn per loom allocated to each pribumi weaver
and issued operating licenses to pribumi businesses that expressly stated the number
of looms that could be employed. Actual yarn allocation was carried out by the tex-
tile cooperatives on the basis of these capacity licenses. Finally, in 1960 all the
country’s small-scale weavers were organized into KOPTEKSI (Koperasi Tekstil
Indonesia), the Textile Co-operative of Indonesia (Palmer 1972: 143–64).
Government Regulation No.1 of 1957 on enterprise control,3 and ensuing policy
decisions laid heavy and extensive restrictions on the enterprises of Chinese descent,
i.e., the establishment of new enterprises, investment for new plant, and transfer of
proprietary authority. From around 1959, when a system of “guided democracy”
(demokrasi terpimpin) was being implemented as the political form of Indonesian
socialism, policies aiming at the replacement of Chinese by pribumi as the leaders of
industry were becoming more hard-line. In May of that year, it was ordered that the
native Indonesian share of the Chinese enterprises’ capital had to surpass 50 per cent
within five years. The government also ordered that total Indonesianization had to be
completed within another ten years (Nagai 1963: 208–24). Presidential Regulation
No. 10 of 19594 also prohibited commercial activities and retailing by foreigners in
villages other than those located in the provincial capitals, district (kabupaten) capi-
tals, and municipalities (kotapraja), and ordered the ownership of all such businesses
to be transferred to local cooperatives.
Within these kind of pribumi capital-promotion policies, the small-scale weaving
industry, especially the hand-weaving sector, flourished. That is to say, as of 1962
the number of hand-looms in Indonesia had grown to 223,905, while the amount of
power-looms had increased to only 20,284 (Palmer and Castles 1965).5 These num-
bers are probably overstated for the purpose of obtaining yarn rations; however, from
the results of data personally collected by this author in the field, the above figures do
not deviate from reality to significant extent.
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Weaving in Ciluluk Village from the 1930s till the End of the Sukarno Era
In the 1930s the village of Ciluluk was under the administrative jurisdiction of
Paseh Sub-district (Onderdistrict), Cicalengka District. In contrast to the develop-
ment of Majalaya’s extensive urban functions, the region around Ciluluk remained
completely agrarian in nature with poorly irrigated paddy and dry fields mixed to-
gether. Warmelo (1939: 13) says that as of January 1938 there were between 16 and
50 hand-looms in operation in the village, while Aten (1952: 213) attests to an aver-
age of 103 looms on the average in twenty-four out of the thirty-three villages lo-
cated in Cicalengka District at the same time.
In the survey kampong, Haji6 H., the father of current farmer-group (kelompok
tani) leader and RK headman Haji T., sold 100 tumbak  (1 tumbak  is equal to 16
square meters) of sawah and purchased four hand-looms to weave sarong. We also
know that the father of a present-day gauze trader owned three hand-looms during
the colonial period. Since there are almost no residents of Chinese descent in the
village, we can safely assume that its weavers were all pribumi (mostly Sundanese).
During the Japanese occupation, the supply of cotton yarn ran out,7 putting almost
the whole cotton-weaving industry out of business. The weavers in Ciluluk were
forced to re-reel their yarn from old clothing and rags.
However, during the 1950s and 1960s the weaving industry in Ciluluk and the
surrounding areas grew tremendously, due to the mechanism of supplying via
KOPTEKSI cooperatives cheap and good-quality yarn imported from Japan, Paki-
stan, and China. The two largest cooperatives set up around the study village were
Koperasi Fajar and Koperasi Putra, organizations under KOPTEKSI. The former
was led by the village headman (Mr. M) at the time and had a membership of about
600, while the latter, whose treasurer was above-mentioned Haji T., was made up of
about 800 members. These groups received their yarn from such suppliers as
KOPTEKSI, and in turn supplied it to local weavers on the basis of the number of
looms registered in business licenses issued by the West Java Provincial Office of the
Ministry of Industry.
These cooperative member weavers managed factories ranging in size from 10 to
over 100 looms. For example, in 1961 Haji T. was licensed to operate 51 looms.
Factories with tens of looms were scattered throughout the village and managed by
the local elite, many of whom owned “large” plots of agricultural land, given the
standard of landholding of the area (in 1965 Haji T. owned 0.77 ha of sawah and 0.80
of dry fields). They carried on operations by employing hired labor from outside the
village. The division of labor at these factories differed depending on their size, but
in the case of a 50-loom operation, the labor would be divided among workers into
sizing, winding, quilling, warping, drawing-in, and weaving processes. In addition to
looms, other necessary equipment, which included reels (golewang), reelers (kincir),
bobbins (paret), and warpers (pihanean), were the property of the factory owners.
Those products were either marketed directly by their local koperasi or purchased
via prepaid order (inden ) by Chinese wholesalers in such towns as Majalaya and
Bandung.
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Some of the owners of these enterprises took the opportunity to branch out into the
field of commerce. There is the case of the gauze merchant, Mr. V, who owned thirty
hand-looms in 1962, but was licensed to operate fifty-four machines. He used the
surplus yarn he received as his licensed ration to trade with other weavers for cloth,
which he sold in the towns.
At the beginning of the 1950s village weavers where all producing sarong, but by
the middle of the decade unbleached shirting (belacu) was also being woven. Then at
the end of the 1960s sarong disappeared; instead pique (tike) and belacu were pro-
duced. This textiles were supplied to urban textile markets through the koperasi and
Chinese wholesalers, meaning that these textiles were of a quality demanded by gen-
eral consumers. The rural weaving industry that developed in Ciluluk village on the
strength of the system described above grew in size to an industry boasting as many
as 4,000 hand-looms in 1964.
This does not mean that the government’s small-scale industry protection policies
did not have their problems. In fact, they were fraught with them. First and foremost,
there was the illegal diversion of cotton yarn to Chinese traders from the official
supply route of state trading enterprises → KOPTEKSI → local koperasi → member
firms. The state trading enterprises and the Ministry of People’s Industry used the
funds received from the diverted yarn to run their organizations. This is also how
Chinese traders, wholesalers and middle- and large-scale textile firms other than
pribumi firms obtained their raw material from the yarn markets (Palmer 1972: 159–
65). Within such a framework we observe an insufficiency among pribumi weavers
of working capital to buy their yarn rations, forcing them to divert yarn to Chinese
merchants in order to raise the necessary funds, while at the same time larger-scale
non-pribumi firms were obtaining their yarn through black-market dealings (Palmer
and Castles 1965: 43).
Add to the above problem skyrocketing inflation, foreign currency shortages and
continuing overall raw material shortages during the last years of the Sukarno era, in
the midst of which the Command of Economic Operations (KOTOE—Komando
Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi) was established in 1964 for the purpose of cracking
down on corruption and illegal disposition of goods. As a result, many cooperatives
stopped functioning effectively (Palmer 1972: 166–70) and village-level koperasi
were no longer able to obtain inexpensive yarn.
The Weaving Industry during the Suharto Era
From the Beginning of the Suharto Era through the 1970s
In 1967, the Suharto administration, which grabbed power in March 1966, ac-
cepted the International Monetary Fund’s recommendations and rejoined the fund,
from which it had withdrawn in 1965. It was then granted aid totaling U.S.$158
million from the countries participating in the Inter-Governmental Group on Indone-
sia (IGGI). During that same year the government enacted Act No. 1 of 1967 on
Foreign Capital Investment.8 Then, during the following year, Act No. 6 of 1968 on
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Domestic Capital Investment9 was passed and contained an article invalidating “all
the provisions in the existing legislation that are in violation of the provisions laid
down in this act” (article 24), and thus abolished many of the laws regulating the
economic activities of people of Chinese descent and ensured increased capital in-
vestment from that community.10 As a result, many foreign investors, especially
Japanese businesses, entered the Indonesian spinning industry beginning in late
1960s, and many also produced in both the spinning and weaving sectors.11 Under
Act No.6 of 1968 Domestic Capital Investment, Chinese-run businesses were able to
obtain government credit and advanced quickly into the synthetic- and cotton-yarn
weaving sectors.
In addition, under the Suharto administration a thorough reevaluation of small-
scale manufacturing (= pribumi capital) protection policies was carried out, and in
1966 the yarn rationing system, in which raw materials were supplied to pribumi
weavers through state trading enterprises and local cooperatives, was abolished
(Palmer 1972: 170). Furthermore, through an export-bonus system (bonus ekspor)
providing bonus certificates for selling foreign currency to importers, imports (in-
cluding smuggling) increased, and, as a result, domestic industries, which had up
until that time been protected under import restrictions, were forced into severe com-
petition with foreign makers.
Chinese-run weaving firms and Japanese joint ventures in textile industries were
not established in traditional textile-producing centers like Majalaya, but rather in
such large cities as Jakarta and Bandung (and their suburbs). These newcomers pro-
duced in the growing synthetic textile sector, while Majalaya and other traditional
textile-producing centers specialized in cotton weaving (Mihira 1980: 305). This is
not to say that Chinese and foreign capital did not also advance into cotton weaving;
and compounded with the fact that synthetics had become viable substitutes for cot-
ton, the small-scale pribumi weavers, who had developed on the strength of previous
government protection policies, were dealt a severe blow.
Even in Majalaya, which had up until that time been the country’s largest weaving
center, the decline experienced by pribumi firms was very noticeable. That is to say,
in Majalaya and its surrounding areas from 1965 on, there was a significant shift in
pribumi weavers who entered into putting-out, or wage-weaving contracts (makloon)
with local Chinese-run wholesalers and weaving firms, resulting in effective control
by Chinese capital over pribumi capital in the industry there. According to a survey
carried out in 1976, Chinese capitalist owned 64 per cent of all the power-looms in
the region, and while 20 per cent was owned but rented by pribumi weavers to non-
pribumi businessmen who managed the firm, only 11 per cent was being employed in
independently run operations by pribumi weavers. This decline in the regions pre-
dominated by pribumi capital could be observed everywhere, including Pekalongan
of Central Java. In Pedan, Klaten District, members of the local koperasi, which was
closely linked with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) were, in the midst of the
political disruption following the September 30th, 1965 aborted coup d’etat, almost
totally put out of business, to the extent that the region lost all significance as a tex-
tile-producing center (Hill 1979: 100–109). Looking at the number of total hand-
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looms during that time, the 1965 figure of 324,000 had by 1975 declined to 181,600
registered machines, with only 65,600 looms in actual operation (Hill 1979: 55–77).
The Weaving Industry in Ciluluk since 1966
For Ciluluk the Suharto era meant local koperasi losing their function and busi-
ness licensing losing all meaning. From 1967 on, the village’s weaving industry fell
into decline, and the factories that had been producing belacu and pique were forced
to either cut back or go out of business altogether. The village’s once thriving fac-
tory-production system had been all but dismantled. The year 1973 was particularly
bad, as the fire that destroyed the Tanah Abang textile wholesale market in Jakarta
stopped all sale of pique from this village. As a result, during 1974 and 1975 villagers
who had worked at the local pique factory would leave the village in groups at 5 a.m.
each morning in order to travel to the wet-rice producing Rancaekek region in search
of agricultural day labor. Those for whom work was not available would immedi-
ately return to the village; those who found jobs would return when the work was
done. Also from 1974, the number of villagers going to Bandung to pull becaks
(pedicabs) was definitely on the rise.
Small-Scale Manufacturing under the Suharto Administration
The kind of disaster which the small business community of weavers experienced
has been perceived as problem involving the fall of pribumi capital before the on-
slaught of foreign and Indonesian Chinese capital. From the time this situation be-
gan, a sense of crisis had been growing, especially among pribumi weavers and Is-
lamic intellectuals.12 Strong criticism was leveled by both students and intellectuals
in general against what is termed an industrialization policy dependent on foreign
capital. Japanese business came under especially strong fire for its tendency to form
Indonesian joint ventures exclusively with local Chinese entrepreneurs. “The com-
petition with foreign capital and the difficulty in obtaining credit from banks has
thrown existing producing regions into bankruptcy,” said one Majalayan pribumi
weaver at a student conference in January of 1974 (IDE 1975: 455). “From Novem-
ber 1968 to March 1974, the spinning industry has created 18,000 new jobs. How-
ever, the traditional weaving industry is threatened with bankruptcy at its loss of
391,000 jobs,” explains Siahaan et. al (1978: 92). It was this type of criticism that
triggered the anti-Japanese riots (the “Malari” incident) when Prime Minister Tanaka
visited Jakarta in January of 1974.
Together with the above criticism leveled at Chinese and foreign businesses, a
deep feeling of frustration arose from doubts about the government’s ability to pro-
mote pribumi enterprise and about pribumi business people’s inability to respond to
promotion policies (Kuntjorojakt 1973: xiv). Joedono (1973: 216–18) argues that the
problem did not stem from pribumi/non-pribumi racial distinctions, but rather from a
situation that pitted economically weak against economically strong entrepreneurs,
the majority of the entrepreneurs in the economically weak category being pribumi, a
group that tended to be passive in response to market trends, to be dependent on the
government’s policy decisions, and have difficulty paying their debts.
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Joedono’s argument is related to Sadli’s hope for the Indonesian social elite13 as a
social reference group. Pribumi business people are still too fragile to function as a
social reference group, like capitalists. Such an argument puts little faith in the cre-
ation of a pribumi-capitalist social stratum based on the World Bank’s trickle down
approach, which will only cause greater inequality in income distribution.
Small-Scale Manufacturing Promotion Policy of the Suharto Administration
Even before the Malari incident, the Suharto administration had considered vari-
ous ways of promoting small industries and had begun implementing a portion of
them. After the incident, an all-out effort to enact them was begun. In response to
critics who were insisting that not enough restrictions were being imposed on foreign
capital, that not enough fault was being attributed to the Chinese business commu-
nity, and that not enough was being done positively to foster pribumi capital, the
government took steps to protect weaker economic groups and foster small-scale
manufacturing enterprises.
The protection of weaker economic groups took the form of more restrictions on
foreign capital and non-pribumi entrepreneurs. In 1971 the government prohibited
all foreign trading companies from carrying on commercial operations inside Indo-
nesia and drew up a list of industries in which foreign capital would not be allowed to
participate. Then on January 22, 1974 President Suharto decided on the following
measures through the Economic Stabilization Council. All joint ventures were as
quickly as possible to consist of at least 51 per cent Indonesian ownership; a “nega-
tive list” was to be drawn up in order to clearly establish what economic sectors
would be closed to foreign capital; foreign-capital investors were to employ more
skilled Indonesian workers; all foreign-capital investors were to be joint ventures
involving only pribumi partners; ownership in previous joint ventures with non-
pribumi Indonesians was to be transferred to pribumi partners; and at least 50 per
cent of the stock in domestic capital investors was to be sold through the securities
exchange to pribumi investors. In addition, all investment credit was to be issued
only to pribumi firms.14 All businesses financed with domestic capital amounting to
Rp. 500 million or more were required to be licensed by the Capital Investment Co-
ordination Board (Antara, Jan. 23, 1974: 1–2). Later the government actually imple-
mented a portion of these presidential directives. In 1977, the above-mentioned
“negative list” was transformed into the Priority Rating List of 1977 for Domestic
and Foreign Capital Investment.15
The major part of the small-scale manufacturing promotion policy had to do with
financing. In 1971 the government established PT Ansuransi Kredit Indonesia as a
“credit insured institution for financing small-scale firms” and then set up PT Bahana
Pembina Usaha Indonesia for the purpose of smaller loans, capital participation, and
management support for small-scale firms. In response to criticism that the govern-
ment itself would not give small-scale firms credit, 65 per cent of the government’s
investment credit during 1973 was earmarked for small-scale firms; and at the end of
that year the Bank of Indonesia instituted the KIK (Kredit Investasi Kecil) small
credit program for fixed capital and the KMKP (Kredit Modal Kerja Permanen)
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small credit program for working capital (BP2K 1979: 44–45, 237–44, 250–56).
KIK provided loans of Rp. 5 million or less payable within five years (including
any grace period) at an annual interest rate of 12 per cent. KMKP provided loans of
similar amounts payable within three years at an annual interest rate of 15 per cent.16
Moreover, if within two years the corporate performance of a borrower was improv-
ing and payments on the loan were on time, an additional loan of Rp. 10 million was
possible under each program.17 (Some of these conditions were changed as time went
on [Idrus 1988: 44].) Beginning in 1974 a “kredit mini” program was established for
loans of Rp. 100,000 maximum, and from 1976 loans of Rp. 500,000 or less were
made available to village unit cooperatives (KUD—Koperasi Unit Desa) and village
unit business cooperatives (BUUD—Badan Usaha Unit Desa) to finance small-scale
commercial activities. Cooperative members were entitled to loans of up to Rp.
15,000 for periods ranging from one week to three months—kredit candak kulak.
One more important part of the government’s small-scale manufacturing promo-
tion policy involved technological/management training in the form of BIPIK
(Proyek Bimbingan dan Pengembangan Industri Kecil), a program to guide and de-
velop small-scale industry. During its First Five-Year Economic Development Plan
(Pelita I, 1969/70–1973/74) the government also set up PROBINKRA (Proyek
Pembinaan Kerajinan Rakyat), a program to train people in handicrafts, and the guid-
ance was carried out together with exhibit and sale of the craftsmanship in the old
induks (Lempelius 1979: 122–24). BIPIK was aimed at not only education and train-
ing, but also management consulting, experimentation, demonstrations, sales, and
market-information networking. BIPIK centers were located both at the central gov-
ernment level and the major provincial cities. On the provincial-level small-scale
manufacturing service centers, called PPIK (Pusat Pelayanan Industri Kecil), were
set up, while on the district-level small-scale manufacturing development units,
called UPIK (Unit Pelayanan Industri Kecil), were established. Also, in the major
industrial areas marketing promotion units (UPP—Unit Promosi Pemasaran), tech-
nical servicing units (UPT—Unit Pelayanan Teknis), etc. would be located accord-
ing to the specific needs of small businesses in each locality. In Majalaya a UPT was
set up with general and specialized instructors for diffusing technological informa-
tion throughout the area.
The year 1979 marked the formation of the LIK (Lingkungan Industri Kecil) sys-
tem of mini industrial estates,18 as well as a foster parent system (sistem bapak-
angkat) aimed at developing the art of subcontracting.19 Finally, there were the coop-
eratives for small-scale manufacturing including household production, called
KOPINKRA (Koperasi Industri Kecil dan Kerajinan Rakyat), which were set up
1987 and based in the sentra industri.
How the above programs and policies were implemented in the village of Ciluluk
to deal with the crisis that occurred in the local weaving industry will be dealt with in
the next chapter.
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Notes
1 Textile Inrichting Bandung (Bandung Textile Institute), which was founded in 1921, de-
veloped this treadle loom in 1926 by improving the existing indigenous model called the
gedogang loom. It is generally referred to as the TIB after the institute that developed it, but
in Indonesian it is abbreviated ATBM because of its Indonesian name, alat tenun bukan
mesin. The ATBM helped increase productivity of hand weavers from 1/50 to 1/5 of the
power-loom capability. Textile Inrichting Bandung was a research center instrument in
popularizing the ATBM and training weavers in its operation.
2 As to the reasons for the expansion at that time of the weaving industry in West Java,
particularly the Majalaya region, on the strength of its main commodity sarong, (1) differ-
entiation of the peasantry there was already well advanced, (2) the use in West Java of
sarong, which was pre-dyed, was already in widespread use throughout the region, in con-
trast to the dominance in Central and East Java of batik, which was dyed after weaving, and
(3) the development of Majalaya as an entrepôt for agricultural and consumption products
by virtue of its being the terminus on the railroad originating at Bandung (Matsuo 1970:
33–36)
3 Peraturan Pemerintah No. 1, Tahun 1957 tentang Penyaluran Perusahaan-perusahaan
[Government Regulation No. 1 of 1957 on Enterprise Control].
4 Peraturan Presiden No. 10 of 1959 tentang Larangan Bagi Usaha Perdagangan Kecil
Eceran yang Bersifat Asing di Luar Ibukota Daerah Swatantra Tingkat I, II, serta
Keresidenan [Presidential Regulation No. 10 of 1959 on Prohibition of Small-Scale Retail
Activities for Foreigners Outside the Capitals of First, Second Level Local Governments
and Residency].
5 The reasons why the spread of hand-looms was greater than power-looms at the time, in
spite of government support given to pribumi entrepreneurs, were (1) “they were not con-
vinced of its benefits and their ability to handle it” (Palmer 1972: 89), (2) “the production
of sarong is so complicated—using already dyed mixed yarns and making twilled cloth—
that power-looms are not usually used” (Matsuo 1970: 65–66), and (3) the slow pace of
electrification in the agrarian regions into which the weaving industry had advanced.
6 Haji is a title given to Muslims who have made a pilgrimage to Mecca.
7 Many looms were employed during this time in the manufacture of sacks made out of sisal
jute. (See Iwatake 1981: 127–33, 177–78.)
8 Undang-undang No. 1 Tahun 1967 tentang Penanaman Modal Asing.
9 Undang-undang No. 6 Tahun 1968 tentang Penanaman Modal Dalam Negeri. All follow-
ing references to “domestic capital” are related to the type of investment sanctioned under
this act.
10 The 1968 Domestic Capital Investment Act stated that all business licenses issued to for-
eign enterprises would expire ten years later in the commercial sector and thirty years later
in the industrial sector (Article 6). However, by virtue of the implementation in 1960 of the
1958 act (Undang-undang No. 2 Tahun 1958 tentang Persetujuan Perjanjian Antara RI dan
RRT mengenai Soal Dwi-Kewarganegaraan) concerning the ratification of a agreement
between the Republic of Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China with regard to the
question of double nationality, the government basically urged Chinese residents to obtain
Indonesian citizenship. Even though the 1958 act was abolished in 1969, a presidential
decision (Keputsan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor: 240 Tahun 1967 tentang
Kebijaksanaan Pokok yang Menyangkut Warga Negara Indonesia Keturunan Asing) in
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1967 concerning Suharto administration basic policy on foreign-descent Indonesian citi-
zens stated, “Indonesian citizens of foreign descent are Indonesians with the same rights
and obligations as other Indonesians.” Therefore, no restrictions on foreign enterprises in
Indonesian law apply to naturalized citizens of Chinese descent.
11 Between 1967 and 1977, foreign capital investment (called PMA [Penanaman Modal
Asing]) authorized by the Capital Investment Coordination Board and its predecessor
amounted to U.S. $2.983 billion (59.1 per cent of the total), while domestic capital invest-
ment (called PMDN [Penanaman Modal Dalam Negeri]) was valued at U.S. $2.066 billion
(40.9 per cent of the total). For the textile-manufacturing sector alone, PMA accounted for
40.9 per cent of investment, while PMDN accounted for 20.9 per cent. Some 37.2 per cent
of all the PMA for this period came from Japan (Okada 1981: 186–90), and between 1967
and 1976 25.9 per cent of that Japanese investment went into the textile industry (Siahaan
et al. 1978: 35). Japanese capital was concentrated largely in Indonesian textile production
from 1968 to 1974, a period during which nineteen of twenty-one  firms put into operation
by Japanese textile makers were in the spinning sectors (ten concerns carrying on both
spinning and weaving) (Indonesia 1978: 10–133).
12 The Indonesian Islamic League Party (PSII—Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia) held its 33d
annual political convention in Majalaya on July 23, 1972. It was decided there to demand
that the government reconsider its stand on pribumi capital protection and its policies con-
cerning foreign capital (Antara, Aug. 1, 1972: 8–9). It goes without saying that Majalaya is
a strong basis of PSII support.
13 Sadli (1957: 374–83), in expressing disagreement with Boeke’s (1951) theory of the coex-
istence of pre-capitalist agrarian society and imported Western capitalism without the
former in transition to the latter, perceived the possibility of the former adapting to the
latter or some integration of the two forms, and thus offered a valuable problematic for
analyzing issues arising from such a process of adaptation/integration. It would be through
such a process, said Sadli, that the social elite of the former social form would be able to
function as a social reference group.
14 A “pribumi firm” was defined as any business having at least 75 per cent pribumi stock
ownership, or at least 50 per cent, if the business was managed by pribumi executives
(Antara, Jan. 23, 1974: 1–2).
15 This list both prohibited foreign investment and urged through favorable measures domes-
tic investment in such heavy fabrics as sarong and shirting, while stipulating that applica-
tions for investment in these products by economically weak groups were to be given
special favor (Indonesia 1977: 38). In 1978, investment in these product industries was
closed to all except economically weak groups (Decision of the Chairman of the Capital
Investment Coordinating Board No. 2 of 1978 dated Feb. 15, 1978 on the Priority Rating
List of 1978 for Domestic and Foreign Capital Investment). Dishcloth material and gauze
were probably also included in the heavy fabric category. However, restrictions were loos-
ened with the 1985 list, which allowed all domestic investors to participate in power-loom
weaving (some cities and all foreign investment being excluded), while only the areas that
excluded domestic and foreign investment were gedogang loom weaving and hand-loom
weaving, and the small-business reservation scheme regarding these specific products had
been abolished (Indonesia 1985). Hill (1979: 151–52) describes how a group of weavers
lobbied the Department of Industry, which in 1977 recommended that serviettes and cloth
for hospital be reserved for small businesses, but concludes that “as in the case of the
reservation scheme, it is unlikely that this could ever be implemented.”
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16 Both of these programs were geared towards small-scale pribumi businesses whose assets
including moveable and real-estate were valued at Rp. 20 million or less after subtracting
liabilities (BP2K 1979: 238–39).
17 Lempelius and Thoma (1979: 164–71) cite many problems with these programs, such as
complicated application procedures, late loan repayment, loan security valued higher than
the credit, the exclusion of businesses with ten employees or less, and unclear credit condi-
tions.
According to a survey of 100 small businesses in West Java by the Management Re-
search Institute, Padjadjaran University (Indonesia 1980b), the main reason (55 per cent)
cited as to why managers had been forced to interrupt operations was lack of working
capital, while 75 per cent of the respondents said that they needed bank financing. Sixty-
nine per cent said that they had applied for credit at a bank, and 22 per cent said they had
sought credit from local cooperatives and/or companies they did business with. However,
only 20 per cent could say that they had succeeded in receiving credit from any source. The
main reasons why they had been turned down was insufficient loan security (58 per cent)
and having no business license (16 per cent).
18 Idrus (1988: 155) conducted a study of these estates in 1979 and found that, not very sur-
prisingly, estates developed if most of the businesses that located there were on sound
financial footing in terms of return on investment, working capital ratio, etc. and continued
to perform well, while a majority of financially unsound, poor performance businesses
were causing stagnating estates.
19 Thee (1985) has shown that the government forced this program through for the purpose of
strengthening local procurement of parts for automobile-assembly joint ventures, but the
decision had no economic rationality to it. Domestic parts procurement was overwhelm-
ingly done by either the assembler simply manufacturing them itself or obtaining them
from established affiliates, subsidiaries, or some other assembler. Therefore, local subcon-
tractors played a rather insignificant role in the process. Hamid (1985) studied subcontrac-
tors in a diesel-engine manufacturing enterprise and found that 20 per cent of the necessary
parts was supplied by subcontractors to the assembler, and those parts required only very
low technical know-how to make.
Concerning the foster parent program itself, in Majalaya and its environs, for example,
there were between 1984 and 1985 a total of 230 firms equipped with power-looms; how-
ever, the foster parent relations set up between small-scale firms in Majalaya and large
corporations elsewhere amounted to only fifteen cases and involved despatchments from
one state-textile company and a flour mill affiliate of a large business conglomerate (Indo-
nesia 1985a: 44–52), thus it supported only a very small part of Majalaya’s weaving indus-
try.
However, in the case of the export-oriented rattan furniture industry in Tegalwangi,
Cirebon District, subcontract relationships between local small businesses and local large
trading manufacturers and large city-based exporters grew quickly in connection with the
government’s ban on the export of raw or semi-processed rattan materials during the mid-
1980s. This a special case, since the levels of technology required of the large maker and
subcontractor were identical up to the final processing stage excluding finishing process
(Iskandar et al. 1991). Also, in the case of Majalaya, where the foster-parent program failed
to develop, we do find a quite complicated division of labor involving a lot of subcontract-
ing and putting-out within the area of Majalaya (Matsuo 1970: 70; Hardjono 1990: 17).
